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You cannot see it, but what you cannot see, you have to show in images.
Claude Lanzmann1
It is time to end [the] defensive posture and to adopt a different way of looking at
historical films, to suggest that such works have already been doing history.
Robert Rosenstone2
Considering film as historical research entails thinking of it not just as a historical source or
a kind of popularised presentation of history, but as a tool of production by which unique
historical insights can be gained. Though film is widely regarded as a legitimate source material
of historical scholarship, it is seldom employed as such. Siegfried Kracauer’s investigation of
the popular rise of Nazism in German society3 and Marc Ferro’s study of Russian revolu-
tionary history are among the pioneering works in this field.4 The presentation of history in
film is at the very least discussed among historians as a serious option to aid the dissemi-
nation of historical insights into the classroom and the larger public realm. Increasing numbers
of historical journals have started providing space for film reviews. Renowned historians like
Robert Rosenstone and Natalie Zemon Davis have also participated in the production of his-
torical films and published their reflections on the experience of this involvement.5 But, to
think of film as a medium of historical research still seems to be a very odd idea for the over-
whelming majority of historians.
Robert Rosenstone’s claim, cited above, which urges historians to end defensive postures
and to take historical films as works that ‘have already been doing history’6 may seem less
provocative in the context of cultural studies than in history departments. Rosenstone
suggests that we should ‘derive theory from practice by analyzing the development of how
the past has been and is written’7 in the historical film. The challenging character of this
approach may explain why Rosenstone in part seems to shy away from his own claim.
Although he defends filmmakers like Oliver Stone as historians of a new kind, when referring
to several movies about the Shoah Rosenstone states, ‘like all historical films, this group is
not capable of explaining long-running national, European, or world geopolitical develop-
ments’ (my emphasis). He limits motion pictures to the experience of an ‘important experi-
ential quality ... by giving us the illusion that, for a little while, we witness, or even live,
the problems, angers, fears, joys, and pains of other lives set in other times’.8 In this essay I
wish to take up Rosenstone’s suggestion that we might consider some filmmakers as his-
torians and push it a little further by exploring Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah as a model for
the filmic inquiry into history.
The problematic of the shoah-representation
The Shoah is, in many regards, a very special subject matter for historians. The possibility or
impossibility of the adequate representation of the Shoah, whether in text or in film, is a
complex and multidimensional discussion. One aspect of this discussion is the implied
normalisation of the unspeakable horrors and the vast magnitude of the event produced
by showing it in dramatised form. Any intention to stage a re-enactment of the last moment
in the gas chambers of Auschwitz would be a disgusting belittlement of the Shoah. And
any dramatisation of the fate that befell a single person would run the risk of betraying the
destiny of the vast majority of the victims. There is no depiction—whether documentary or
fictional—in which you can watch the Shoah unfold as a simple event.
‘The problem of representing the Holocaust can also be seen as the core problem of history’,
suggests Rosenstone. In our representations, we inevitably alter the past and impose our
meanings upon events and moments in such a manner that those who lived through them
might have great difficulty in recognising them. Therefore, Rosenstone concludes, ‘[i]n
this the Holocaust is like any other historical problem’.9 Although I agree that we generally
cannot represent the past ‘as it really was’, there is still something special in the problem of
representing the Shoah. Let me outline three interlinked reasons for this.
First, there is no adequate concept to represent the Shoah. Any concept intended to approxi-
mate or identify with the Shoah is always already defeated by Auschwitz because life itself
has become guilty and any conceptual identity with the Shoah shameful. Theodor W. Adorno
points to this specific problem when he raises the question of ‘the drastic guilt of he who was
spared’ because ‘his mere survival calls for the coldness, the basic principle of bourgeois
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subjectivity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz’.10 In an age determined by
the guilt of mere survival, he suggests, an altogether new conception of truth is needed
that is independent of adaequatio or the conceptual appropriation of reality. Thus thought,
according to Adorno, when it refuses to respond to the non-conceptual, lapses into com-
plicity: ‘If thought is not measured by the extremity that eludes the concept, it is from the
outset in the nature of the musical accompaniment with which the SS liked to drown out the
screams of its victims’.11 Every serious investigation of the Shoah would have to deal with
this gap between the undeniable fact of Auschwitz and the impossibility of capturing it with
a transcendental concept adequate for the facts. Therefore the Shoah becomes a distorting
non-place that is beyond any positive representation. And it is a special challenge to treat
the Shoah in film because films rely on images, and images need to show something that is
positively perceptible.
Second, the Shoah is fractious to any linear account of history. Conventional history takes
it to be its central task to find, select and arrange facts in order to create an intelligible narrative
that explains why a particular prior cause leads to a specific result. This kind of history,
understood as the representation of past facts within a narrative framework, implicitly grants
intelligibility to the represented. However, any attempt to make the Shoah fully intelligible
is suspect, as it seeks to confer legitimacy on the gruesome event by granting it a coherent
meaning. Again, it is indeed a difficult task to grasp the relation between traceable facts that
connect past events to the Shoah without conceding to it an intelligible meaning. However,
as I will demonstrate by analysing Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah, the complexity of motion
pictures may turn out to be an advantage in this context.
Third, unlike other historical events, there is no visual object emblematic of the Shoah
because the absence of visibility is thematic to the event itself. At the centre of the Shoah is
not only the annihilation of all Jews but also the liquidation of all evidence of that crime.12
Every testimony of the extinction is the exception to the rule, the witness being only the one
who escaped his or her fate. Therefore, the absence of testimony from those who did not
escape and the invisibility of the crime is necessarily an integral aspect of any representation
of the Shoah. How can the invisible be shown by audio-visual means? Any film dealing with
the Shoah must find at least an implicit answer to this question.
Analysing Lanzmann’s shoah as a model of filmic history
An oft-repeated objection to film as an apposite medium for the transmission of history is
its capacity to produce emotions. However, historians like Rosenstone insist on acknowl-
edging the contribution to historical insight and understanding that films can provide through
their experiential qualities. I wish to expand on this observation and demonstrate that
emotional quality is a vital feature of the specific cognitive mode that Lanzmann’s film
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promotes. Thus, the allegedly emotional filmic treatment of history is not arbitrary to the
history it constructs. Moreover, if well employed, it is not a failing but a strength of film.
This specific relation between emotion and cognition is precisely why I would like to
analyse Shoah as a model of filmic investigation of history, and not merely as an example. As
Adorno claimed in his Negative Dialectics, while an example is arbitrary to the content it
explains, a model irradiates a general issue by its own specificity: ‘A model covers the specific,
and more than the specific, without letting it evaporate in its more general super-concept.’13
I do not regard Shoah as an illustration of historical cognition, but as a contribution to a
debate on history. I survey this film in terms of its strategies of presentation and, hence,
the construction of history. My aim is to derive categories for academic historical research
from the particular answers that the film gives to the specific question of representing the
Shoah in film.
The way I treat Lanzmann’s film draws on some assumptions that are not exactly
commonsense among historians. Let me discuss just two of them briefly.
First, I assume that the form and medium of articulation of historical insights matter in
terms of a record of past events but are also constitutive of the historical insight itself. For
this assumption I rely on the concept of metahistory, as it has been developed by Hayden
White. His analysis of the nineteenth-century European historical discourses reveals that the
underlying influences of the prevalent writing styles and the choice of narrative tropes were
indeed consequential in its construction. If this is true for written texts, it should be true for
films as well. To address the specific problem of the representation of history in film, White
coined the word ‘historiophoty’ to distinguish it from written historiography.14
Second, I presume that history is not about some truth hidden in historic facts, but about
a relation we establish with the past events based on present-day material and immaterial
artefacts. Therefore it is ‘more appropriate to talk about the referentiality than the reference’,
as Hans-Jürgen Goertz states in his investigation of the theory of historical referentiality.15
‘The idea of the truth being rediscovered in the evidence is a nineteenth-century modernist
conception and it has no place in contemporary writing about the past’, concludes Alun
Munslow in his examination of history in a postmodern age.16 This does not entail the utter
loss of any criteria for the construction of history. Regarding the Shoah, Robert Eaglestone
has consistently pointed out that the notion of history as a literary genre can be helpful, even
to defend the historiography of the Shoah against David Irving’s ‘scientific’ Holocaust denial
intentions.17
Drawing on these assumptions it is feasible to ask the question: how does the consider-
ation of film as historical research work? I suggest that a possible answer to that question
is Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah. However, before I add more substance to my argument, it
is necessary to provide the reader with a brief overview of the plot.
Plot summary of shoah
Claude Lanzmann’s nine-and-a-half hour film Shoah (1986) relates the story of the systematic
annihilation of the European Jews by the German Nazis. Lanzmann started working on the
film in 1974, and it took him twelve years to complete the final version. The movie was
originally divided into two parts for theatre exhibition and later shown in a four-part version
on television and distributed on DVD. As a radical departure from convention, Lanzmann
refuses to use historic footage as illustration. In long travelling shots of trains, railways and
highways, he shows the present-day images of the routes that millions of victims of the Shoah
were once forced to take to the extermination camps. In extended pans the camera feels its
way across the landscapes where European Jews were once murdered in their millions.
Lanzmann talks with survivors, perpetrators and bystanders and, in the process, produces
a kind of filmic oral history.
The film is structured around a chronological account of the German extermination
program. It begins in Chelmno with Simon Srebnik who survived the annihilation camp
of Chelmno. Lanzmann convinced Srebnik to return to this place and to tell the story of
Chelmno, where the extermination machinery was still in its initial phases and where the
Nazis killed their victims while driving them in trucks which rerouted their exhaust into
their interiors. Srebnik’s eyewitness account is followed by many more testimonies, among
them one by Abraham Bomba, who survived the camp at Treblinka while working as a
barber for the Germans, as well as that of Filip Müller, a survivor of the Sonderkommando
at Auschwitz who had to operate the crematorium at the camp. Jan Karski, a liaison officer
for the exiled Polish government, describes, apparently still under shock, what he saw when
he visited the Warsaw Ghetto undercover with the aim of writing a report that would con-
vince the allied forces to intervene in favour of the Jews.
These testimonies of the Shoah are set in contrast to conversations with bystanders who
had lived next to the extermination camps, people who worked on the railroads and thus
participated in the crime, as well as with the interviews Lanzmann intended to get from
German perpetrators. Most of the Nazi perpetrators refused to be interviewed or would only
be filmed with hidden cameras. In the film, Lanzmann does not confront them directly with
his opinions but insists they recount their version of what had happened and what their com-
mitment to the Shoah was. By doing so he appears to place trust in the critical capability of
viewers to build their own opinion.
The inscription of history in film
To grasp the multiplicity of forms in which history appears in film, it is important to remem-
ber the above-mentioned definition of history as a relation to the past and to understand that
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film is more than merely a material series of images, for these images need to be projected,
viewed and recognised as a film. In other words, film is a dynamic structure that mediates
the social relation between those who are filming, that which is being filmed and those who
are viewing the film. Like history, film exists only as a theoretically and socially constituted
entity. Hence, I believe the historic relation can be inscribed into the filmic relation.
How is history inscribed in Lanzmann’s film? To answer this question, let me take a fifteen-
minute sequence that occurs shortly after the beginning of the second film. We are inside a
barbershop; the camera looks into the mirrors at the wall that reflect the room. Some hair-
dressers are seen attending to their clients. A text insert tells us that the barber at the
centre of the image on the screen is Abraham Bomba and that we are in Holon, Israel.
Although no word has been spoken up until this point, already a lot of history has been made
available through the images: The clothing of the workers and clients, the decoration in
the room, as well as the grain and colour of the images induce a nostalgic impression of
the 1970s. These images are themselves artefacts of a long receded past, and as one looks at
the images in 2007 it is clear that Bomba may not be alive today.
I call such inscription of history that occurs due to the lag between registration and per-
ception of a sound and/or image the archive-mode. Like any material we find in archives, the
relation with the past established by the archive-mode depends on the permanence in time
of the film-material and is transformed by the changing modes of perception and com-
prehension of the film itself. The archive-mode points to the relation between the event of
filming and the event of viewing. This does not, however, mean that time is locked in the
archive. On the contrary, what we see today is different from what was seen at the time the
image was filmed. The observation above regarding the grain of the image and the outdated
and quaint seventies’ decoration and fashion in the barber shop point towards this quality
and may not have been seen as such at the time the scene was filmed.
As mentioned earlier, Lanzmann rejects this very mode of historical inscription to con-
struct a history of the Shoah in film. Instead, he appears to operate in the present. He directs
his voice off camera to Bomba and asks him to explain how he came to be selected to work
as a barber in Treblinka. The film captures Bomba’s testimony of what had happened but it
is more than just Bomba’s words which inform us; we see his face as well, his movements,
his voice, sometimes trembling, sometimes firm. Here, it is not the material film that persists
in time, but the person registered by the camera. People as well as landscapes or buildings
bear marks of time that can be captured in film. These marks become readable at the moment
of projection. I call this ability to capture the relation of the filmed object to the past the
trace-mode. Bomba’s relation to his own past is expressed through his gestures and his voice,
the audible sounds and the eloquent silences are captured like traces. The theme of this mode
is the afterlife of the past or the present marked by its past.
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The special importance of the trace-mode to Lanzmann’s history of the Shoah becomes
palpable in this sequence. Because he was a professional barber, the Nazis had chosen Bomba
to cut the hair of the victims just before their execution in the gas chambers. When asked
about his feelings the first time he saw women entering the gas chamber, Bomba avoids
the question by talking about the details of the procedure. On Lanzmann’s insistence, he
starts describing a situation when the wife and sister of one of his fellow barbers happened
to enter the gas chamber, and then he suddenly stops—there are no words to describe the
feelings, the emotional state of the barbers and those women. The camera witnesses the
painful return of Bomba to his past, the lack of an adequate language for the Shoah. Bomba
wishes to end the conversation but Lanzmann insists on continuing. After almost four
long minutes of silence, Bomba starts again and states briefly that his colleague could not
manage to do more than simply try to stay a second longer with his beloved. The long moment
of silence that precedes the answer appears to have been much closer to the event than any
description of it in words. It is thus the silence of the trace-mode that makes it possible to
‘show’ without reproduction, to present without representation.
The whole sequence seems at first glance not unlike a documentary filmed at Bomba’s
everyday place of work. But, in fact, the entire setting is staged. At the time of the interview
Bomba had retired, and prior to that he had run a barber shop in New York.18 The classical
division of documentary and fiction does not work anymore. When Lanzmann makes Bomba
repeat his movements while cutting the hair of the victims in Treblinka, he produces at first
glance an image that emulates the past event. The decision to film Bomba’s testimony in a
barbershop establishes a historical relation due to the constellation it produces. The inscrip-
tion of history derives from a vital piece of information about the past prior to the event of
filming. This strategy is most often employed in historical fiction films which re-enact certain
events. I call the production of sounds and/or images that seek to imitate a viewpoint situated
in the past the emulation-mode.
However, Lanzmann rejects the re-enactment of the Shoah as well as the archive-mode
and, in fact, the scene involving Bomba is only an abstract emulation of a single gesture. It
is not at all the filmmaker’s intent to reproduce the hair-cutting situation in Treblinka. The
light flooded barbershop in Holun, with mirrors on the walls and the clients sitting in padded
chairs, is certainly not a replica of the chamber with bare walls and wooden benches, crowded
with naked women seconds before their murder.19 Lanzmann creates sounds and images
that are rather abstract and evocative of the past event, instead of reproductions of the event
itself. The historical relation itself becomes topical and audible as well as visible. I call this
production of sound and/or image the connotation-mode. It is, to my mind, the most self-
reflexive mode of inscription.
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Operational modes of visual cognition in shoah
Before I proceed further with inquiring into the filmic strategies of constructing history, it is
important to sound a note of caution about a possible misunderstanding. The inscription of
history into film is altogether different from the construction of history in film. The four
modes of inscription show how the historical relations are immanent to the moving images,
while the construction of history is the way in which a new relation to the past is established
by a specific composition of images.
With this differentiation in mind, I would like to shed some light on how Lanzmann con-
structs a history of the Shoah through his images. In his film he clearly privileges the trace-
mode, though he also uses the connotation-mode while staging interviews. How does
Lanzmann construct his history from these particular images?
The semiotic approach,20 which entails the analysis of film as a syntactic system of
signs, to be read and interpreted as text, reaches its limits rather quickly and appears to
fall short of grasping the historical relation at stake in the filmic images. The trace-image
relates to the past not as a signifier arbitrary to the signified, as it would be typical for a sign.
A look at the repeatedly employed images of landscapes in Shoah illustrates this vividly:
images of the former places of extinction, now overrun with grass and trees; landscape shots
that are confronted with the bodily presence of survivors within the frames or intercuts with
close-ups of their faces which are ‘readable’ as landscapes as well. The turf of Treblinka,
the scarred face of Abraham Bomba, these do not function as signs for the Shoah. The trace
is not a sign which is arbitrary to the artefact; it is in fact the embodiment of an inner relation
to the past. Moreover, the trace is not itself the subject matter. Even though the speechless-
ness of Bomba is governed by the events of the Shoah, the Shoah is not the silence itself,
nor is Bomba’s life an intelligible continuation of the Shoah.
The trace-mode of images stimulates the imagination. But the images created—at least in
my mind—are neither a representation nor a replication of the Shoah. The film refuses to
generate any image that fulfils Leopold von Ranke’s famous claim ‘to show what really
happened’, or less ambitiously, to show how it might have happened. I do not have a clear
image of the gas chambers of Treblinka crowded with victims in front of my eyes, but perhaps
an idea of the impossibility of imagining adequately what has happened in the past. There
exists forever a gap between Bomba’s experience and what he can describe through words.
In the film, this gap—the relation between Bomba and the Shoah—becomes visible. And
such a relation with the past is indeed what history is. Lanzmann constructs history out of
images, where not only the past but history itself is inscribed as a trace; not a positive sound
and/or image of representation but one constructed ‘negatively’ through the absence of such
sound and/or image.
131OLAF BERG—THE CHALLENGE OF FILM
—
Lanzmann supports the effect of the trace-mode of the image in two ways: by not showing
the archival footage, and by using the connotation-mode, as in the barber’s shop, which is
so consciously unlike a remodelled gas chamber. The connotation-mode is similar to the
trace-mode, in that it is not arbitrary to the artefact. By showing the individual, banal and
innocuous activity of cutting someone’s hair, it intensifies the contrast to the monstrous,
inexpressible situation in Treblinka. The connotation-image is deduced from the gap, which
becomes visible in the trace-image. It is derived from the relation; it is not the relation itself.
And this ‘impossible’ irreversible relation, which can never be rendered as stable and intel-
ligible, becomes visible in combination with the trace-image.
Lanzmann states that Bomba embodies his own history by standing in the barber’s shop
rather than sitting in an armchair and telling his story.21 I would like to conceptualise this
notion of embodiment further. Such embodiment is neither a symbol nor a repetition. It
generates a tension in which the past and the present overlap, but without becoming identical
or one. It is precisely this tension that makes the incommensurable gap between the past
and the present visible. Embodiment is the central element of the historical construction
in Lanzmann’s film. Embodiment is at the same time a temporal and a spatial form: temporal,
as it links the present of the filming with the past that is invoked; spatial, as the very process
of invoking the past occurs only because of its corporeal presence in a specific place. As in
ritual, the body in trance can become a medium to connect with ancestors; in Lanzmann’s
film the body becomes a medium of history, a medium within the medium of film. Shoah
does not open up a gaze into the past but into our relation with the past, into the gap, which
is not reconciled. In this way Lanzmann can rightly say: ‘You cannot see it, but what you can-
not see you have to show in images.’22
Embodiment in dialectical time-images
My analysis has shown that on the level of the specific content of Shoah the historical relation
which is constituted by the film cannot be explicated through a semiological approach. By
employing my categorisation of four modes of inscription of history into film, it is possible
to describe the function of images in Lanzmann’s filmic investigation into history more accu-
rately and to determine embodiment as a basic concept within his survey of the Shoah. To
what extent can this result be generalised for the concept of film considered as historical
research? Is the concept of embodiment specific to the communication of history in film? To
answer this question, it is useful to explore Gilles Deleuze’s philosophical approach to film
and to link it up with the concept of the dialectical image that Walter Benjamin outlines in
his philosophy of history.23
A central concern of Deleuze during the period in which he wrote his books on cinema24
was the relation between ‘the visible and the sayable’, as Mirjam Schaub points out in the
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subtitle of her monograph on Deleuze.25 The visible and the sayable, Schaub argues with
Deleuze, do function in different systems guided by different rules. In contrast to the sayable,
the visible does not require successive actualisation. On a formal level, Deleuze argues that
Christian Metz’s semiology of film is circular in its reasoning: a filmic syntax equates images
with propositions, but this is achieved by subjugating images to a syntagmatic paradigm.26
Instead, Deleuze proposes that while the linguistic sign as concretion of the sayable refers to
an external entity, the image as the concretion of the visible includes all meaning in itself,
but it never reveals its meaning at once, because its meaning is always complicated, always
in a state of emergency.
Benjamin’s philosophy of history relies on this quality of the image which includes complex
meanings and reveals only particular meanings at a specific time. ‘The true image of the past
flits by ... For it is an irretrievable image of the past which threatens to disappear in any
present that does not recognize itself as intended in that image.’27 Benjamin considered such
an image a ‘dialectical image’. He aims his critique against the additive procedure of His-
toricism to fill the homogeneous and empty time with a mass of data.28 The dialectical image,
in contrast, brings the movement to a standstill and, therefore, ‘is that wherein what has been
comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation’.29 It is thus a concept of a
luminous historical relation that opens the possibility of changing the present by revealing
new meanings from the remains of the past.
Benjamin’s concept of history is of special interest in the context of the problem of
representation raised by the Shoah. Traditional history relates to the past through a mode
of representation that implies a fixation with the represented past events and an idea of the
present as inevitably and irrevocably shaped by these events. The dialectical image, in
contrast, establishes a relation to the past events as a constellation that rejects such fixation,
enabling the gap between the irretrievable past events and the present manifestation of its
remaining forces to be addressed. Benjamin’s above cited notion of history as an irretriev-
able flitting-by image and his emphasis on the importance that the present ‘recognize itself
as intended in that image’,30 refers to a process usually identified as emotional: in a specific
constellation of the present, the image emerges, attracts us and evokes a feeling. The first
step in our recognition of ourselves as ‘intended’ in the image that flits by is not a rational
decoding, but an instantaneous intuition. This emotion is not the illusion of living through
past experiences to which Rosenstone refers, but a crucial aspect of filmic cognition as
well as Benjamin’s concept of history.
Although Benjamin was also concerned with cinema, he developed his concept of the
dialectical image in the context of his theory of linguistic images in literature, and never
applied it systematically to film. To conceptualise a dialectical image in film it is helpful to
return to Deleuze. He distinguishes between two main forms of representation of time in
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film: the movement-image and the time-image. The movement-image is marked by rational
cuts that establish a sensory-motor bond, that is, a linear relation between time and space,
between action and reaction. In this context, time is represented indirectly as a measure of
movement. This is also true of Eisenstein’s concept of dialectical montage. But even in the
movement-image ‘the whole is no more an addition than time is a succession of presents’.31
Hence, there is an intrinsic resistance in film to a linear account of history.
While the movement-image is best represented by the great Hollywood productions,
the time-image emerged after World War II in the devastated landscapes of Europe—in Italian
Neo-Realism, the French Nouvelle Vague, the New German Cinema—and in the Third World
Cinema.32 The time-image breaks with the idea of a sensory-motor link and lets different
times coexist. In a way, the image is doubled; it becomes an irreducible unit of an actual image
and its own virtual image. Actual and virtual images are different but indistinguishable.
Bomba’s embodiment of his own history can be recognised as such a time-image. More-
over, in a significant part of the sequence the camera captures Bomba in the mirror, and
his mirror image tells his story from Treblinka. As Deleuze explains, the doubled image of
the mirror illustrates the time-image: ‘The mirror-image is virtual in relation to the actual
character that the mirror catches, but it is actual in the mirror, which now leaves the char-
acter with only a virtuality and pushes him back out-of-field.’33 The coexistence of different
times in the time-image match with the constellation of what has been with the now-time in
Benjamin’s conception of the dialectical image.
The use of time-images allows Lanzmann to avoid transforming the history of the Shoah
into something rational that has terminated in the past. He shows us history not as progress,
but as a constellation of danger by juxtaposing the times of the gas chamber in Treblinka
and the barbershop in Israel into an image of different but indistinguishable times. It enables
the viewer to sense the gap between the two times and to build through that feeling a cognitive
relation to the past.
A model for filmic investigation of history
Shoah demonstrates the potential of film for historical research. In response to the specific
problems of representation that the Shoah raises, Lanzmann developed a filmic structure
built on embodiment that emerges from trace- and connotation-images. The characteristic
of the visual, which contains an ever-complicated knowledge that never reveals all its meaning
at the same time, has proven to be useful in constructing a discourse about the Shoah with-
out reference to an external transcendental concept that would have always been defeated
by Auschwitz. The film creates a historical time-space relation which is, on the one hand,
capable of presenting time itself as independent from an indirect measurement through move-
ment in space and, on the other hand, is reconnected to space through its bodily presence
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